cm0002@lemmings.world (@cm0002@lemmings.world)
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Could the XZ backdoor have been detected with better Git and Debian packaging practices?
Senza categoriaHow did the changes in the binary test files tests/files/bad-3-corrupt_lzma2.xz and tests/files/good-large_compressed.lzma, and the makefile change in m4/build-to-host.m4) manifest to the Debian maintainer? Was there a chance of noticing something odd?
Could the XZ backdoor have been detected with better Git and Debian packaging practices?
The discovery of a backdoor in XZ Utils in the spring of 2024 shocked the open source community, raising critical questions about software supply chain security. This post explores whether better Debian packaging practices could have detected this threat, offering a guide to auditing packages and suggesting future improvements.\n
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