Something we need. Looks to be NLNet funded? The README looks to be AI written, it contains a lot of the confident triple-statements often found in LLM-generated content. I hope that is as far as it goes because this might be brushing up against NLNet's generative AI policy: https://nlnet.nl/foundation/policies/generativeAI/

@portafed@mastodon.social may I ask whether LLM was used in the production of this project/code?

@julian @julian@activitypub.social Yes, fair question and you deserve a direct answer.

The README and proposal documentation were drafted with AI assistance
(Claude/Anthropic) and then reviewed and edited by me. The cryptographic
design ed25519 keypairs, JCS/RFC 8785 canonicalisation, Merkle
construction, MigrationProof signing input is my own technical work.

The Rust code in portafed-core implements real cryptographic primitives
and passes real tests. It is not generated boilerplate.

Bravo! I like the idea, and honestly I was thinking of making something similar myself. Maybe I’ll implement it into my platform.

@PortaFed cc @silverpill

@PortaFed ~ do you think these ideas would work alongside the existing work being done by the W3C social web community group? https://swicg.github.io/activitypub-data-portability/lola

I *think* you're solving the issue of "my server disappeared, I don't have a backup, and I can't prove I'm still me." Is this close?

Because that's the one use case that the portability spec DOESN'T do. So, maybe there's a way for us to work together, instead of making competing standards.

@julian @evan @jonny @PortaFed

@benpate Yes, that’s exactly the gap I’m aiming at: the case where the old server is gone, hostile, or unavailable, and the user needs some way to carry forward verifiable account state without relying on that server’s cooperation.
My reading is that LOLA covers the cooperative portability path well, while this harsher failure case still needs more work. I don’t see PortaFed as a competing standard so much as a possible building block for that scenario.

@PortaFed That's awesome. Let's work you into the existing effort. We could use all the help we can get.

Also: I'm pretty new to the data portability spec; so I know that "hostile server" is out of scope, but I wasn't there to know why that choice was made. I'm *guessing* is was too much to tackle at the time.

But one way or another, it would be great to have something in place for this situation, too.

I still need to read your work fully, so I understand what we're talking about

@julian
@evan @benpate @PortaFed
Can't make heads or tails of this one

@jonny@neuromatch.social tracks doesn't it

@benpate That would be great and happy to contribute wherever it fits.
My guess on the scope decision is the same as yours: hostile-server recovery is genuinely harder, and a cooperative spec is already a lot to get right. Makes sense to tackle it separately.
Take your time reading. I'll put together a short write-up of how MigrationProof could slot into the existing spec easier to react to something concrete than to an abstract pitch.

@julian @PortaFed
giving a further read: I can't really imagine a case where someone would a) regularly be creating signed backups and also b) know in advance where you wanted to migrate to to set the destination_did. Like if this is for the case where the instance has shut down, you might have some signed backup, but you probably haven't planned in advance where you would want to migrate, and if the instance is down you wouldn't be able to create the migration object after the fact.

the validation strategy for the export is sort of mystifying to me. if the whole object is signed, then why would you need a merkle tree for objects and also an object count? if the contents of the object have changed post signing, then the signature validation will just fail and those are irrelevant.

true to form for LLM generated documents, several critical things are left undefined, like what last_accepted_sequence is or how that works.

probably the most important problem is that it's not really clear how all other instances are supposed to handle this, which is the entire hard part of a migration spec. Like, if the purpose here is to preserve identity, then you would need to have all the other instances come to see the new identity as being equivalent to the old identity, and there's no discussion of how that process works for third-party instances at all. like e.g. in FEP-1580 i had to spend a long time gaming out scenarios for how third party instances would handle a move event.

so without that it's not really an account portabiltiy spec, it's an account export/import spec, which is fine, just not really needed since signing objects and collections (which this spec should use anyway) is already described by other specs.