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  3. Limiting Group Membership Metadata Exposure
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Limiting Group Membership Metadata Exposure

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  • evan@activitypub.spaceE Questo utente è esterno a questo forum
    evan@activitypub.spaceE Questo utente è esterno a questo forum
    evan@activitypub.space
    scritto ultima modifica di
    #1

    This is a discussion thread for an open issue on GitHub:

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    Limiting group membership metadata exposure · Issue #83 · swicg/activitypub-e2ee

    (Discussion thread: https://activitypub.space/topic/421/limiting-group-membership-metadata-exposure) This issue is intended as a brainstorming discussions based on several comments by people such as @ThisIsMissEm from the Trust and Safet...

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    GitHub (github.com)

    evan@cosocial.caE jamesmarshall@sfba.socialJ 0 3 Risposte Ultima Risposta
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    • evan@activitypub.spaceE evan@activitypub.space

      This is a discussion thread for an open issue on GitHub:

      Link Preview Image
      Limiting group membership metadata exposure · Issue #83 · swicg/activitypub-e2ee

      (Discussion thread: https://activitypub.space/topic/421/limiting-group-membership-metadata-exposure) This issue is intended as a brainstorming discussions based on several comments by people such as @ThisIsMissEm from the Trust and Safet...

      favicon

      GitHub (github.com)

      evan@cosocial.caE Questo utente è esterno a questo forum
      evan@cosocial.caE Questo utente è esterno a questo forum
      evan@cosocial.ca
      scritto ultima modifica di
      #2

      @evan@activitypub.space @elle ^^^^^^

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      • evan@activitypub.spaceE evan@activitypub.space

        This is a discussion thread for an open issue on GitHub:

        Link Preview Image
        Limiting group membership metadata exposure · Issue #83 · swicg/activitypub-e2ee

        (Discussion thread: https://activitypub.space/topic/421/limiting-group-membership-metadata-exposure) This issue is intended as a brainstorming discussions based on several comments by people such as @ThisIsMissEm from the Trust and Safet...

        favicon

        GitHub (github.com)

        jamesmarshall@sfba.socialJ Questo utente è esterno a questo forum
        jamesmarshall@sfba.socialJ Questo utente è esterno a questo forum
        jamesmarshall@sfba.social
        scritto ultima modifica di
        #3

        @evan yay, kudos for addressing this! It's true that not all participants would want to identify themselves, e.g. to all friends of friends when replying to a friend's private post. I think it's OK for such repliers to still be identifiable to (only) their friend the OP. Otherwise, harassment would be more possible if the reply were completely anonymous, whereas if the OP knows their identity they can use social pressure to mitigate harassment.

        One challenge is if Alice posts and Bob replies, and Bob is blocking Charlie, then how does Alice (or Alice's server, e.g. an MLSGroup) know not to forward Bob's reply to Charlie, unless Alice knows that Bob is blocking Charlie? Blocklists are private information. One possible solution is to use Private Set Intersection (PSI) to determine the intersection of Alice's recipients and Bob's blocklist. PSI is slow and typically requires recalculating every time one of the sets changes, but Updateable Private Set Intersection (UPSI) can handle set changes quickly.

        1/

        jamesmarshall@sfba.socialJ 1 Risposta Ultima Risposta
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        • evan@activitypub.spaceE evan@activitypub.space

          This is a discussion thread for an open issue on GitHub:

          Link Preview Image
          Limiting group membership metadata exposure · Issue #83 · swicg/activitypub-e2ee

          (Discussion thread: https://activitypub.space/topic/421/limiting-group-membership-metadata-exposure) This issue is intended as a brainstorming discussions based on several comments by people such as @ThisIsMissEm from the Trust and Safet...

          favicon

          GitHub (github.com)

          0 Questo utente è esterno a questo forum
          0 Questo utente è esterno a questo forum
          0xllx0@activitypub.space
          scritto ultima modifica di
          #4

          Expanding on the end of our discussion today:

          I think a good mitigation for metadata exposure is to more-or-less follow option C from: https://github.com/swicg/activitypub-e2ee/issues/83, with the addition that all MLS protocol messages + user messages should be encrypted blobs wrapped in an activity, possibly a Note or the Create wrapping a PrivateMessage/Note. I'm in favor of using a core, and/or a widely implemented vocabulary type to minimize code changes needed server-side.

          The encrypted blob would go in the activity's content field (like in Option B), and the activity would be signed using one of the Group actor's keys so it could be posted to the Outbox. This protects leaking membership information, since the server would just see a signed activity using one of the Group actor's keys. To further obfuscate member identity, the MLS epoch key could be used for this purpose, and added to the list of the Group actor's keys. Details about trade-offs of using the epoch key probably need to be discussed, as it would leak key rotation information, so a separate long-term key shared by all participants may be better.

          For message delivery, all participants would used authorized fetch (using the long-term key) to retrieve all Outbox messages. Each client will attempt to decrypt every message, and only be able to successfully decrypt messages intended for them. This would obfuscate the identity of receiver participant(s).

          Network-level metadata is still a concern, but would be better handled by the respective layer in the OSI stack.

          At the application level, using the above scheme would sufficiently obscure metadata from the host server, and outside observers. It essentially is a combination of Options B and C, except that the hosting server has no information about the participant list (that is all contained in MLS ciphertext messages). It has the side-benefit of requiring essentially no server-side changes at all, since all messages would just appear as normal activities.

          To avoid total centralization of the server, "fallback" servers could be listed in the bto field like in Option B. Though, this could also be optional, as it leaks at least some participant information, e.g. at least one participant has an account in that server list. Fallback servers could also be coordinated in-band using MLS messages, and a new Group actor created in case of a down server, malicious host, etc. However, fallback servers are tangential to the metadata discussion.

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          • jamesmarshall@sfba.socialJ jamesmarshall@sfba.social

            @evan yay, kudos for addressing this! It's true that not all participants would want to identify themselves, e.g. to all friends of friends when replying to a friend's private post. I think it's OK for such repliers to still be identifiable to (only) their friend the OP. Otherwise, harassment would be more possible if the reply were completely anonymous, whereas if the OP knows their identity they can use social pressure to mitigate harassment.

            One challenge is if Alice posts and Bob replies, and Bob is blocking Charlie, then how does Alice (or Alice's server, e.g. an MLSGroup) know not to forward Bob's reply to Charlie, unless Alice knows that Bob is blocking Charlie? Blocklists are private information. One possible solution is to use Private Set Intersection (PSI) to determine the intersection of Alice's recipients and Bob's blocklist. PSI is slow and typically requires recalculating every time one of the sets changes, but Updateable Private Set Intersection (UPSI) can handle set changes quickly.

            1/

            jamesmarshall@sfba.socialJ Questo utente è esterno a questo forum
            jamesmarshall@sfba.socialJ Questo utente è esterno a questo forum
            jamesmarshall@sfba.social
            scritto ultima modifica di
            #5

            @evan

            UPSI is fairly new technology, just a few years old. I haven't used it myself, but it could be part of the solution for the blocking problem you refer to.

            This was all true as of around 2022, when I was looking into this issue of blocking and private posts, while trying to keep blocklists private.

            If I understand it correctly, I like your MLSGroup solution.

            I guess I should have posted this to the GitHub thread.... 😕

            2/2

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            • evan@cosocial.caE evan@cosocial.ca

              @evan@activitypub.space @elle ^^^^^^

              0 Questo utente è esterno a questo forum
              0 Questo utente è esterno a questo forum
              0xllx0@activitypub.space
              scritto ultima modifica di
              #6

              @evan@cosocial.ca I have a queued reply currently awaiting approval.

              Thanks for starting this thread, and adding the E2EE Task Force! <img class="not-responsive emoji" src="https://activitypub.space/assets/plugins/nodebb-plugin-emoji/emoji/android/1f49c.png?v=b232808582d" title="💜" />

              julian@activitypub.spaceJ 1 Risposta Ultima Risposta
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              • 0 0xllx0@activitypub.space

                @evan@cosocial.ca I have a queued reply currently awaiting approval.

                Thanks for starting this thread, and adding the E2EE Task Force! <img class="not-responsive emoji" src="https://activitypub.space/assets/plugins/nodebb-plugin-emoji/emoji/android/1f49c.png?v=b232808582d" title="💜" />

                julian@activitypub.spaceJ Questo utente è esterno a questo forum
                julian@activitypub.spaceJ Questo utente è esterno a questo forum
                julian@activitypub.space
                scritto ultima modifica di
                #7

                @0xllx0 apologies for the delay! The queued posts are approved and you should be good to post freely now.

                1 Risposta Ultima Risposta
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                Ciao! Sembra che tu sia interessato a questa conversazione, ma non hai ancora un account.

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